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ABSTRACT
Several researchers in happiness studies have called for an increased sociopolitical
interest in indicators of societal happiness. However, recent evidence for the proposed
paradoxical effects of valuing happiness suggest that an increase in society’s perceived value of
happiness may exert a detrimental, inverse influence on well-being. This notion is based on
previous research demonstrating that manipulating participants to value happiness causes them to
experience less positive emotions, compared to controls, when viewing positive film clips.
Following the humanistic notion that the maximization of societal happiness is an advantageous
sociopolitical endeavor, the proposed paradoxical effects of valuing happiness present a
psychological barrier that researchers must strive to understand and, ideally, overcome.
Previous experimental research on the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness has
focused on participants’ emotionality as an operational definition of happiness. However,
drawing from the Subjective Well-Being construct, emotionality is only one of several
components of happiness. Building from this Subjective-Well Being framework, this study
expands upon previous research by investigating whether a valuing happiness manipulation
influences participants’ emotionality while they contemplate their own happiness. To examine
this, nineteen participants were divided into two groups, one which received a valuing happiness
manipulation (n=9) and the others served as a control group (n=10), and instructed to
contemplate their personal happiness for 45 seconds. To measure participants’ emotions during
this task, facial electromyography data were collected from the corrugator supercilii and the
zygomaticus major facial muscles, a measure that previous research suggests is sensitive to the
emotional value of thought.
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Results indicated that participants manipulated to value happiness did not experience
significant differences in facial electromyography activation compared to controls. However,
although non-significant, the correlation between facial electromyography activation and
participants’ rating of happiness differed substantially for participants manipulated to value
happiness (average r=.41 for corrugator, average r=-.09 for zygomaticus) and controls (average
r=.-.29 for corrugator, average r=.14 for zygomaticus). The counterintuitive correlations for
participants led to value happiness, despite not experiencing significant difference in the
emotional value of the happiness contemplation task, provide preliminary evidence that these
participants utilize the information retrieved from the contemplative stage in a qualitatively
different way than controls when judging their own happiness. More specifically, the correlations
for participants led to value happiness trend in the opposite direction of controls, demonstrating
that increases in positive emotion during happiness contemplation actually are associated with
lower scores on a self-report of happiness. This study suggests that the paradoxical effects of
valuing happiness does not influence the retrieval of information when contemplating ones’
happiness, but may influence (in an apparently detrimental fashion) how this information is
utilized when judging one’s happiness.
Although the between-condition differences in correlations failed to reach statistical
significance (more specifically, p=.09 for corrugator), this study provides preliminary evidence
for the existence of a new dynamic of the proposed paradoxical effects of valuing happiness that
is novel to the happiness studies discourse. Limitations, implications, and future directions are
discussed.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The U.S community believes that higher levels of happiness are a critical factor in
determining the desirability of a life (King & Napa, 1998). In addition to being highly valued on
the personal level, reviews of the happiness studies literature suggest that happy people are more
successful, more creative, possess better coping capabilities, and are better work and societal
citizens (Diener & Ryan, 2009; Lyubomirsky, King & Diener, 2005). In response to its apparent
benefits to society, some argue that nations should consider their citizen’s happiness an ultimate
public policy goal (Veenhoven, 2004) and a leading social indicator measure (Oishi & Diener,
2014); a philosophical utilitarian principle (Bentham, 1879) that is a stark contrast to the current
international emphasis on GDP and GNP. Notably, the Eastern country of Bhutan has already
adopted this emphasis on Gross National Happiness, and the apparent emerging interest in
societal happiness at the international level is being paralleled by robust advancements in the
scientific realm.
In response to its promising and intriguing nature, the empirical study of happiness has
boomed over the past 50 years and a new science of positive psychology has emerged (Seligman
& Csikszentimihalyi, 2000). Contrasting the historical “negativity bias of traditional
psychology,” researchers in positive psychology are interested in investigating human strengths,
virtues, happiness, and potential in order to facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of
human nature (Sheldon & King, 2001; p.216), as well as to foster the development of positive
human characteristics. The advent of positive psychology has considerably contributed to growth
of happiness studies, which now utilizes various multi- and interdisciplinary insights in order to
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expand the scientific understanding of this topic. With these advancements, one can speculate
that people may one day live in a world where the majority of its inhabitants are in a state of
psychological flourishing. However, is this perhaps overoptimistic? Is our current emphasis on
happiness nothing more than a “modern obsession” (Burnett, 2011)? These are difficult,
enormously complex questions to tackle; ones that are much too large for an undergraduate
thesis. Instead, this work will focus on one factor that may eventually play a large role in this
debate: the proposed paradoxical effects of valuing happiness.
The Paradoxical Effects of Valuing Happiness
A desire to be happy is somewhat of a cultural universal. However, there is some
evidence that valuing happiness too much can be detrimental and ironically counterproductive.
Research conducted by Mauss, Tamir, Anderson, and Savino (2011) suggests that valuing
happiness can be paradoxical; providing both correlational and experimental evidence that it can
reduce the positivity of one’s emotional reactions. Corroborating these findings, a separate study
found that valuing happiness is inversely related to positive emotion and satisfaction with life,
and positively associated with negative emotions and depression (Catalino, Algoe &
Fredrickson, 2014). The causal and correlational evidence for the paradoxical effects of valuing
happiness introduce important considerations for the field of positive psychology. For instance,
these results suggest that there may be both effective and ineffective ways for one to pursue
happiness (Catalino, Algoe & Fredrickson, 2014). More importantly, the evidence for the
paradoxical effects of valuing happiness suggests that prospective utilitarian public policies may
have unintended inverse effects on societal happiness if they additionally result in an increase in
the perceived value of happiness. However, borrowing from the common idiomatic expression,
2

before we throw the baby out with the bath water, happiness studies should strive to further the
understanding this phenomenon, and determine if and/or how this psychological barrier to
increased societal happiness can be overcome.
In the experimental proceedings of Mauss and colleague’s original work (2011),
participants’ emotional reactions to a positive film clip were measured through implicit and
explicit post-hoc measures of emotionality. To investigate the effect of valuing happiness, half of
these participants received a sham newspaper article that manipulated the perceived value of
happiness by elaborating on the importance of and benefits of maximized happiness, and the
other half received control articles containing no mention of happiness. Results from both
measures of emotion suggest that the manipulated participants experienced less positive
emotional reactions to a positive film clip. Subsequent questioning demonstrated that
participants’ disappointment at their own feelings mediated this effect.
The present study expands upon the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness by
investigating whether manipulating participants to value happiness affects the way they think
about their own personal happiness; a subjectivist approach that is intended to complement and
expand upon the previous research. More specifically, this study analyzes whether the valuing
happiness manipulation validated in Mauss and colleagues’ original study causes participants to
experience less positive emotion when contemplating their own happiness, which due to the
relationship between emotion and cognition (reviewed later) would serve as an indicator that
they are thinking less positive thoughts. In addition, this study analyzed whether the valuing
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happiness manipulation causes participants to self-report that they are overall happier than
controls.
Before elaborating on this study, some constructs of interest will first be briefly reviewed.
More specifically, this paper will first: a) discuss what happiness is, elaborating on the
theoretical perspective utilized in this work, b) deliberate on theoretical conceptualizations of
emotions, c) examine the notion of an affective value of thought, and d) explore proposed ways
to measure the affective value of thought.
What Is Happiness?
Before studying the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness, a working definition of
happiness must first be established. This is perhaps easier said than done, as the complex
construct of happiness has been contemplated and debated for centuries. To study happiness at
the empirical level, a large and diverse set of measures has been created (see Veenhoven World
Database of Happiness for an extensive list). Some of these measures focus solely on emotional,
or hedonic, aspects of happiness (Kahneman, 1999), whereas others have included more
eudemonic aspects, such as purpose and meaning in life (Crumbaugh & Maholick, 1964).
However, some have suggested that neither of these perspectives is sufficient, and that happiness
may be best conceived as a multidimensional phenomenon that includes aspects of both distinct
categories (Ryan & Deci, 2001). Following this logic, some recent accounts of happiness have
integrated these factors in order to formulate more comprehensive accounts of the construct
(Seligman, 2002). In addition, others have maintained that maximum personal well-being is
achieved through the pursuit of both eudemonic and hedonic factors (Huta & Ryan 2010;
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Peterson, Park & Seligman, 2005). However, even with efforts to develop more comprehensive
frameworks, the definition of happiness is still being debated and refined to this day (Delle Fave,
Brdar, Freire, Vella-Brodrick & Wissing, 2011).
Subjective Well Being and Evaluative Judgments of Happiness
Considering the multifaceted, contested nature of the happiness construct, pragmatically,
it makes sense for researchers to hone in on more specific aspects of happiness, while
simultaneous maintaining an awareness of the limited scope of these focused perspectives. This
is the approach employed in this current paper, where concentration is placed upon a specific
aspect of a more hedonic conceptualization of happiness, Subjective Well Being. This
framework maintains that happiness consists of life satisfaction, positive emotion, and low levels
of negative emotion (Diener, 2000), and conceptualizes happiness as a subjective phenomenon.
While happiness researchers predominately utilize self-reports of global subjective wellbeing, the cognitive components of happiness are equally as fascinating. For instance, although
much has been learned about happiness over the years, how people assess and think about their
own happiness is still a major unanswered question (Veenhoven, 1991). As the name implies,
subjective well-being places a strong emphasis on the subjective nature of happiness. Therefore,
in order to more comprehensively understand this construct, it is advantageous to understand the
underlying processes that create this subjective lens. The analysis of the mental processes that
inform global reports of subjective well-being is a perspective I refer to as an evaluative
judgment of happiness.
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As discussed by Schwarz and Strack (1999; p.61), “reports of subjective well-being
(SWB) do not reflect a stable inner state of well-being. Rather, they are judgments that
individuals form on the spot, based on information that is chronically or temporarily available at
that point in time…” This notion of contextual reconstruction has received attention across the
psychology discipline, possibly most notably in Frederick Bartlett’s discussions on memory
(Bartlett & Bartlett, 1995). In this work, it is argued that memory cannot be replayed or retrieved,
but only reconstructed at the time of remembering. Similarly, the notion of contextual
reconstruction also has been elaborated upon in more general considerations of survey
methodology (Groves et al., 2004). Here, it is argued that people do not constantly keep working
representations of their beliefs, but rather are likely to base their answers on whatever
considerations come to mind at the time. Adapted to the subjective happiness framework, the
notion of contextual reconstruction suggests that people do not possess static representations of
their global well-being, but rather utilize contextually-dependent cognitive processes to
formulate conclusions and self-reports of their subjective happiness.
The mental process that informs one’s answer to a survey question, such as “How happy
are you?” has been conceptualized as a dynamic interplay between four discrete processes: 1)
comprehension of the question, 2) retrieval of information, 3) judgment and estimation, and 4)
reporting an answer (Groves et al., 2004). However, happiness researchers generally focus the
majority of their energy on the last component of this model, with less emphasis on how
participants retrieve information and make a judgment about their personal happiness (see Figure
1). The evaluative judgment perspective, which focuses on these two intermediary processes,
retrieval of information and judgment, illuminates the cognitive elements that inform subjective
6

reports of happiness; a perspective that previous research on the paradoxical effects of valuing
happiness has yet to investigate.
In the original work on the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness, happiness was
operationalized as an emotion. However, while emotionality is certainly an important and
necessary ingredient of subjective well-being (Myers & Diener, 1995), this research has thus far
left the subjectivist component of subjective well-being unaddressed. This thesis investigates
happiness from the evaluative judgment of happiness perspective; examining whether the
paradoxical effects of happiness influence the mental processes that occur when people think
about and evaluate whether they are happy. This was investigated by utilizing an objective,
psychophysiological measure of the emotional value of thought: facial electromyography. In
theory, if the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness influence participants’ emotions while
reflecting upon their own happiness, facial electromyography will be able to non-obtrusively
measure this effect. Before elaborating upon this psychophysiological measure of emotion,
however, it is important to briefly review the theoretical foundation of emotion.
Theoretical Accounts of Emotion
Research on the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness suggests that valuing happiness
leads one to experience emotions that are less positive. Although this, at face value, seems rather
straightforward, there is an ongoing debate within the affective sciences on exactly how to define
an emotion. As stated by Fehr and Russell (1984; p.464), “Everyone knows what an emotion is,
until asked to give a definition.” The debate over how to conceptualize emotion has raged for the
past century and has (perhaps a bit overly dramatically) been recently referred to as “The
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Hundred-Year Emotion War” (Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley & Barrett, 2013). However,
considering the importance of emotionality in more hedonic conceptualizations of happiness, this
is an important development to follow.
Based on common perception, the average person conceptualizes and reports emotions as
discrete entities. For instance, one may tell a friend that he/she is excited during a visit to
Disneyworld, or suggest that he/she is sad about failure in a course. Many of these discrete
emotions, commonly referred to as “basic emotions” (Ekman, 1992), have been identified, and
subcortical neural networks for some of them have been located (Panksepp & Biven, 2012).
However, factor analyses of self-reported emotion often reveal that these intuitively discrete
emotions often yield two factor dimensional models (Larsen & Diener, 1992). Perhaps the most
popular of these models, James Russell’s Circumplex Model of Affect (1980), argues that
emotions are represented on a two-dimensional circumplex affective structure. Russell’s
affective structure, visualized as a grid, possesses a horizontal valence (i.e: positive, negative)
axis, and a vertical arousal axis. The circumplex theory posits that the human emotional
experience can be conceptualized as fluctuations along an affective grid, and it has been added
that the discrete emotions that we report are socially constructed phenomenon informed by
certain combinations of these affective values (Barrett, 2006). For example, the discrete emotion
of excitement would be characterized as our socially constructed label of a moderate degree of
positive affect and a moderately high degree of arousal, or alertness. Although many have
investigated emotions as discrete entities, the circumplex model is currently receiving more
support by both psychophysiological and self-report data in the literature (Mauss & Robinson,
2009); although mixed-emotion research has pointed to some noteworthy flaws (Larsen &
8

McGraw, 2014) that support a less popular, alternative dimensional account of attitudes and
emotion (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994). While there are some flaws in the circumplex model of
emotion, this conceptualization is still useful, popular in the affective sciences, and supported by
the preponderance of evidence.
In the present study, the emotions that participants experience while contemplating their
happiness are examined; integrating past research’s sole focus on emotional components of
happiness with the more subjective evaluative judgment perspective. However, before continuing
there are a two underlying theoretical questions that deserve discussion: 1) Does cognition
possess an affective value? 2) If so, it possible to quantify participants’ affective experiences
while they are participating in introspective thought?
The Affective Value of Thought
Although cognition has traditionally been researched in an emotional vacuum, more
recent advances demonstrate that a dynamic interplay exists between higher order cognition and
emotion (Blanchette & Richards, 2010; Storbeck & Clore, 2007). For instance, there is
accumulating evidence that affective states can be projected onto higher-level judgments
(Forgas, 1995; Lench, Flores & Bench, 2011), and influence memory and cognitive processing
styles (Ceci & Ornstein, 2014; Clore & Palmer, 2009; Fredrickson, 2001; Lench, Flores &
Bench, 2011). Furthermore, research on emotional regulation demonstrates that this interaction
can be bidirectional, as various emotional regulation strategies (Gross, 1998), such as cognitive
reappraisal, can be utilized to alter an emotional states.
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In addition to its bidirectional relationship with emotion, I maintain that cognition also
can be emotionally charged. In other words, cognition not only has the ability to regulate
emotions; it also is capable of eliciting emotional reactions. Consider the following scenario:
research participant Valerie comes into the lab for a study on how one’s affective state can
influence various cognitive processes. To put Valerie in a negative affective state, the
experimenter asks her to simply ruminate on a particular negative thought for 45 seconds: her
own funeral. As the IRB would almost certainly interject, it may be unethical to ask Valerie to
perform this emotional elicitation task, as she will likely get upset, uncomfortable, and
potentially depressed. Similar, less evocative emotional elicitation strategies have been utilized
in the past (Gasper & Clore, 2002; Velten, 1968), and it appears that thinking about certain
topics elicit powerful affective responses. For example, both self-reported and physiological
indicators of anger reveal that thinking about an angering experience elicits negative emotions,
and that emotional regulation strategies attenuate these responses in such a way that is consistent
with theories of cognitive reappraisal (Ray, Wilhelm & Gross, 2008). In addition, it is argued
that working memory and emotion are reciprocally connected, and that verbal working memory
tasks are associated with the experience of positive affect, and spatial working memory tasks are
associated with the experience negative affect (Storbeck & Watson, 2014). Based on this
reciprocal connection, it has been shown that these tasks are not only facilitated by their
respective affective charges, but that they also are capable of eliciting these affective reactions
when employed. Collectively, these reviewed studies support the notion that cognitive
processing is both associated with and charged by emotion; indicating that mental thought
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possesses an untapped emotional or affective value. However, for this postulate to be useful
beyond theoretical considerations, it is practical to quantify this value.
Borrowing from dimensional accounts of emotion, it would not be advantageous to
search for indicators of “angry”, “sad”, or “excited” thinking. Instead, it is more feasible to
investigate the emotional value of thought as varying along an affective structure. Based on this
notion, researchers should focus their efforts on investigating and quantifying how positive vs.
negative thought can be, or, in other words, the affective value of thought. Applied to the current
study, this suggests that participants’ evaluative judgments of happiness will possess an affective
value, and that, if the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness are confirmed, those who are led
to value happiness will possess a less positive affective value of thought than controls.
Measuring Affect
There are many ways to measure affectivity, including self-reports, autonomic nervous
system (ANS) activation, startle response magnitudes, electroencephalography, functional
imaging, positron emission tomography, vocal characteristics, facial behavior, and observer
ratings. To measure valence or how positive vs. negative an affective experience is, self-reports,
ANS measures, and facial behaviors have been determined to be appropriate (Mauss &
Robinson, 2009). Despite several options, this study focuses on the psychophysiological
measurement of facial electromyography, a methodology that is capable of objectively
distinguishing between positive and negative affect (Cacioppo, Petty, Losch & Kim, 1986).
Since the present experiment included an introspective thought period that lasts 45
seconds, it was ideal to gather a continuous measure of valence; a measurement that self-reports
11

cannot necessarily facilitate without introducing potentially confounding cognitive processing.
Facial electromyography is therefore an ideal measure for the present study because it is
continuous, objective, and non-obtrusive (Cacioppo, Petty, Losch & Kim, 1986). While
triangulating this measure with self-reports is certainly advantageous, these reports could
interrupt streams of introspective thought, potentially affecting the cognitive processes of
interest.
Facial Electromyography as a Measure of the Affective Value of Thought
In his writings on the expression of emotions in man and animals, Charles Darwin (1872)
created an influential contribution to psychology that spurred an interest in how emotion is
represented in the face. Following his assertion that human facial expressions reflexively
communicate a message about one’s emotional state of mind, researchers began developing
methods to analyze this facial muscle movement in order to make inferences about a target’s
emotional experience. Facial electromyography, which objectively quantifies the activation of a
facial muscle of interest, has emerged as one of these leading methodologies.
In their seminal article, Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, and Kim (1986) determined that facial
electromyography can provide objective and continuous probes of affective valence. Notably,
they demonstrated that this measure is sensitive to minor changes in facial activation that
observer rating systems, such as the Facial Affect Coding System (Ekman & Rosenberg, 1997),
often cannot identify. While people can exert a conscious and intentional control over many of
these facial muscle movements (i.e: when intentionally smiling to be polite), this facial muscle
activation, as originally discussed by Darwin (1872), often occurs as a reflexive reaction to an
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affective reaction. For example, when viewing images of racial minorities, implicitly racist
participants experience significant activation over frowning muscles, despite being unaware of
this activation and explicitly denying racist attitudes (Vanman, Paul, Ito, & Miller, 1997). Facial
electromyography, therefore, is a desirable methodology for the present study because it can
objectively tap into participant’s affective reactions even if they are unaware that these reactions
are occurring and/or these reactions are below the visual threshold of observer ratings.
While there are several muscles of interest in facial electromyography, the ones most
appropriate for determining affective valence are the corrugator supercilii and the zygomaticus
major. The corrugator supercilii is a muscle located in the brow region that is responsible for
pulling the brow inward to create what is often considered a frown. This muscle is inversely
influenced by positive and negative affect, the former inhibiting and the later potentiating
activity over the muscle in a linear fashion (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley & Hamm, 1993; Larsen,
Norris & Cacioppo; 2003). In other words, positive affect decreases corrugator activation and
negative affect increases corrugator activation.
The second muscle of interest, the zygomaticus major, is located in the cheek region and
is responsible for pulling the lips towards the ear to create what is often considered a smile. This
muscle has increased activation and a j-shaped quadratic relationship with the experience of
positive affect (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley & Hamm, 1993; Larsen, Norris & Cacioppo, 2003).
Although some have failed to replicate the quadratic relationship between zygomaticus major
activation and affect (Robinson, Cinciripini, Carter, Lam & Wetter, 2007), the preponderance of
evidence still supports this association.
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Facial electromyography has been utilized in a large variety of experimental settings
where self-reports cannot be relied upon. However, it is less extensively used to investigate the
affective value of thought, despite results suggesting that it is certainly viable. For instance, in a
study on depression, Teasdale and Bacroft (1977) tracked corrugator activity while six depressed
participants thought 10 happy and 10 sad 30-second thoughts in randomized orders. Withinparticipant comparisons demonstrated that corrugator activity is generally higher when thinking
negative, as opposed to positive, thoughts, although these differences did not always reach
statistical significance. Given the small, six participant sample size utilized in this experiment, it
seems that facial electromyography may be a fairly strong measure of the affective value of
thought, but that relatively larger sample sizes are necessary in order to reliably reach statistical
significance.
A similar study was conducted by Schwartz and colleagues (1996), in which both
depressed and non-depressed participants were asked to mentally re-experience happy, sad,
angry, and “typical day” situations while facial electromyography data were collected. For nondepressed participants, the corrugator experienced significant deactivation during the happy
thoughts, but non-significant activation during sad, angry, and “typical day” thoughts. The
depressed participants, on the other hand, did not experience significant corrugator deactivation
during the happy thoughts, but did experience significant activation during the sad and angry
thoughts. Combining the data from the non-depressed and depressed participants, the corrugator
experienced significant activation/deactivation during happy, sad, and angry thoughts. These
activation patterns are consistent with previous research on facial electromyography as well as
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cognitive theories of depression, although these researchers seemed to focus on a discrete, as
opposed to dimensional, conceptualization of emotion.
Finally, in an experiment investigating persuasion, Cacioppo and Petty (1979; p.2181)
noted that “patterns of subtle facial muscle changes reflected the affective nature of the cognitive
responding before and during the message” (also see Cacioppo & Petty, 1981). Taken together,
these results confirm that mental thought can elicit affective responses, and that facial
electromyography is sensitive, to a certain degree, to these changes. Although quantifying this
affective value of thought is uncommon, these results suggest that, with respect to the current
study, it is certainly feasible.
In the present study, facial electromyography was utilized to determine whether valuing
happiness influences the affective value of thought of participants’ evaluative judgments of
happiness (Figure 1.) In line with previous research on the paradoxical effects of valuing
happiness (Mauss et al., 2011) it was hypothesized that participants manipulated to value
happiness would experiences less positive emotions, compared to controls, when contemplating
their happiness. In addition, it was hypothesized that participants manipulated to value
happiness, compared to controls, would self-report higher levels of overall happiness.
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY
In this current study, facial electromyography was utilized to quantify the affective value
of thought during a 45 second evaluative judgment of happiness. It was hypothesized that the
valuing happiness manipulation utilized in Mauss and colleague’s original study (2011) would
create less positive thinking compared to controls. This manipulation is a sham article that
appears to be discussing broadcasting companies’ interest in viewer’s emotionality, although it
consistently makes statements about the importance of happiness such as “…as is well-known,
people who report higher than normal levels of happiness experience benefits in their social
relationships, professional success, and overall health and well-being.” Unbeknownst to
participants, this sham article is intended to increase participant’s perceived value of happiness,
and has been validated as effective in their original study.
Asking a participant to consider their happiness is a contextually dependent, multi-phased
cognitive process. The evaluative judgment perspective adopted in the current study focuses on
the intermediary processes of selecting information and integrating this information to make a
judgment. If the valuing happiness manipulation negatively impacts participants, a negative bias
in the information selection and judgment procedures would be expected. In this present study,
facial electromyography data was collected while participants contemplated their happiness; a
task that is most closely parallels the information-selection phase of an evaluative judgment of
happiness (see Figure 1.) In accordance with the notion of an affective value of thought, a
paradoxical effect of valuing happiness during this task would be characterized by increased
corrugator and/or decreased zygomatic activation.
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Participants
To be eligible for this study, students had to be over 18 and, due to the potential for facial
hair to confound the electromyography signal, clean shaven. In total, twenty two undergraduates
(19 female, 3 male, mean age=19.91, SD=3.37) participated in this study. Due to a combination
of technical difficulties and incorrect setup procedures, three participants were excluded from
analyses.
Materials and Procedure
Facial electromyography was utilized to determine whether a valuing happiness
manipulation influenced the affective value of thought during an evaluative judgment of
happiness. This facial muscular activation was sampled at 1,000 Hz via a Biopac system (Model
MP35) and processed in its accompanying BSL Pro software. To enable the acquisition of facial
electromyography data, two SS1LA lead adaptors were utilized. All hardware and software was
purchased from BioPac Systems Inc. (BioPac Systems, Inc., Aero Camino Goleta, CA, US.)
All facial electromyography data acquisition was performed largely parallel to the
guidelines set forth by Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). Upon arriving to the study, participants
first reviewed an informed consent document explaining that a male experimenter would be
cleaning and attaching electrodes to various sites on their body. Afterwards to facilitate comfort,
participants were introduced to the Biopac machine (BioPac Systems, Inc., Aero Camino Goleta,
CA, US), which was explained to be a system that measures electrical currents in the body.
Afterwards, participants underwent facial electromyography preparation procedures.
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To ensure a clean signal with stabilized conductivity and limited artifacts, the electrode
contact sites were first cleaned and abraded with an isopropyl alcohol skin-prep pad. Afterward,
five 4 mm silver-silver chloride electrodes (four shielded EL254S and one unshielded EL254),
were filled with electrode conductive gel (GEL100) and attached to the corrugator supercilii,
zygomaticus major, and ground contact sites recommended in Fridlund & Cacioppo’s guidelines
(1986). At this point, participants were informed that the Biopac would be collecting data
throughout the experiment, and that, in order to maintain a clean signal, they would have to try to
minimize their head and body movement when not completing surveys or questionnaires.
After confirming participant comfort, participants were briefly trained to perform
Maximum Voluntary Contractions, which establish the maximum muscular activation in each of
the two muscles of interest. Afterward, they performed two maximum voluntary contractions for
both the corrugator supercilii and zygomaticus major muscles, although some participants were
asked to perform a few extra maximum voluntary contractions due to technological glitches in
the acquisition file. After performing the maximum voluntary contractions, facial
electromyography data were collected over a one minute baseline period. After establishing this
baseline, participants were instructed to begin the experiment on a laptop in front of them.
In an online questionnaire format, basic demographic information was collected from the
participants. Afterward, those in the “valuing happiness” condition received a sham article
intended to increase the perceived value of happiness, whereas those in the control condition
received no manipulation. This sham article can be found in Appendix D, and has been
previously validated in Mauss and colleagues’ (2011) original study.
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Afterward, all participants were instructed to contemplate their own personal happiness
for an experimenter-timed 45 seconds. This time period started only once participants
acknowledged that they were ready. After this contemplation period, participants then filled out
an 11-point overall happiness questionnaire. At the end of the experiment, participants were fully
debriefed. (Appendix F)
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CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS
Facial Electromyography Data Processing
In line with the proposed guidelines in Fridlund & Cacioppo (1986), the facial
electromyography signals were first passed through a 10 Hz and 500 Hz bandpass filter.
Afterward, the data points from the baseline, maximum voluntary contractions, and thought time
periods were rectified (absolute value) and smoothed (moving average), a procedure that is in
line with the guidelines of facial electromyography (Fridlund & Cacioppo, 1986).
While many researchers compare the difference between baseline and manipulation
muscle activation, the use of standardization techniques based on maximum voluntary
contractions is recommended in Fridlund and Cacioppo’s (1986) guidelines. Teaching
participants to perform maximum voluntary contractions of facial muscles allows researchers to
determine and account for individual differences in facial muscle strength in their analyses
(Halaki & Ginn, 2012). With this technique, a percentage of total maximum activation is
rendered, and the differences between baseline activation and manipulation activation
percentages are the unit of analysis.
In this experiment, participants contemplated their own happiness for 45 seconds.
Previous research examining the affective value of thought over time has divided up these time
period into smaller units of analysis (see Teasdale & Bacroft, 1977). The rationale for this
procedure is based on the premise that some emotional reactions may occur quickly, and that a
significant emotional reaction that happens within, for example, the first 5 seconds, may be
rendered non-significant if no other reactions occur in the rest of the thought period. Therefore,
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the 45 second thought period that participants underwent was separated into nine, 5 second
intervals. Afterward, for each interval, the differences between the percentage of activation
during the personal happiness-contemplation portion of the experiment and the percentage of
activation during baseline were calculated.
Corrugator Supercilii Activation during Happiness Contemplation
A series of Shapiro-Wilk tests conducted on the processed differences in corrugator
activation in the nine intervals determined that the majority of these distributions was nonnormal. Coupled with the small sample sizes in each condition, this warranted the use of
nonparametric statistical procedures. Therefore, a series of Independent Samples Mann-Whitney
tests, the rough nonparametric equivalent of an independent sample t-test, was performed;
comparing changes in corrugator activation during the happiness contemplation task between
participants in the Valuing Happiness condition and those in the Control condition. As
represented in Table 1, results suggested that no significant differences in corrugator activation
existed between the valuing happiness and control conditions (average p =.32).
Although a visual inspection of standard deviations suggests that there may be an
interesting between-condition difference, a series of Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances
suggest there were no significant difference between the variance of the control and
manipulation condition in every time interval (average p= .70).
Considering that males are generally less facially reactive in emotional experiences than
females (Thunberg & Dimberg, 2000), it is possible that the few male participants skewed the
results. To examine this, the Independent Samples Mann-Whitney tests were re-rerun with the
21

exclusion of the male participants. Excluding the male participants did not substantially lower
the p-value of these analyses, and all between-condition differences remained below statistical
significance.
Zygomaticus Major Activation during Happiness Contemplation
A series of Shapiro-Wilk tests conducted on the processed differences of the nine
intervals demonstrated that the majority of these distributions was normal, as opposed to the nonnormal distributions of the corrugator data. Therefore, a series of independent samples t- tests
was performed. As represented in Table 2, results suggested that no significant differences in
zygomaticus activation existed between the valuing happiness and control conditions (average
p=.33). These findings were also corroborated by a series of Independent Samples MannWhitney tests (average p=.35).
Once again, although a visual inspection of standard deviations suggests that there may
be an interesting between-condition difference, a series of Levene’s Test for Equality of
Variances suggested there were no significant difference between the variance of the control and
manipulation condition in every time interval (average p= .18).
Considering that males are generally less facially reactive in emotional experiences than
females (Thunberg & Dimberg, 2000), it is possible that the few male participants skewed the
results. To examine this, the Independent Samples Mann-Whitney tests were re-rerun with the
exclusion of the male participants. Excluding these male participants did not substantially lower
the p-value of these analyses, and all between-condition differences remained below statistical
significance.
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11-Point Happiness Rating and Corrugator Supercilii Activation
It was hypothesized that participants’ facial electromyography activation during their
evaluative judgment of happiness task would correlate with their reports of happiness on an 11point scale. To test this, a series of Pearson Correlational analyses were conducted on the
processed differences in corrugator supercilii activation and participant self-reports on the 11point happiness scale. Since previous analyses suggested that no significant differences in
between-condition activation existed during the contemplation task, these correlation analyses
were first run with the data combined from both conditions; exploring whether each 5 second
interval of processed activation correlated with participants’ reports of happiness. Results
suggested that no significant correlations existed between each 5 second interval of processed
corrugator activation and participants’ reports of happiness (average r=.07, average p=.74).
These analyses also were separately re-run within each condition, with results for both the
control (average r=.-.29, average p=.41) and the manipulation condition (average r=.41, average
p=.29) failing to reach significance.
As a exploratory analysis, a one-sided comparison of Fisher r-to-z transformed
correlation coefficients was utilized to assess whether the large difference between the two
conditions’ correlations was statistically significant. Results suggested that this difference trends
towards significance (p=.09).
11-Point Happiness Rating and Zygomaticus Major Activation
A similar series of Pearson Correlational analyses was conducted on the processed
differences in zygomaticus major activation and participant self-reports on the 11-point
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happiness scale. Results from the combined-condition analyses suggested that no significant
correlations existed (average r=.02, average p=.82) between the processed zygomaticus major
activation and participants’ reports of happiness. These analyses also were separately re-run with
each condition, with results for both the control (average r=.14, average p=.69) and the
manipulation (average r=-.09, average p=.64) condition failing to reach significance.
As an exploratory analysis, a one-sided comparison of Fisher r-to-z transformed
correlation coefficients was utilized to assess whether the difference between the two conditions’
correlations was statistically significant. Results suggested that this difference was not
statistically significant (.34).
Analysis of Between-Condition Difference in 11-Point Happiness Ratings
It was hypothesized that participants who were manipulated to value happiness would
report different scores on the happiness rating than controls. A Shapiro-Wilk test of normality
demonstrated that one of these conditions (manipulation) was not normally distributed (p=.03).
Coupled with the small sample size, this warranted the use of a nonparametric procedure.
Therefore, an Independent Samples Mann-Whitney U Test was performed. Results suggest that
there were no differences in the self-reported happiness of controls and those manipulated to
value happiness (p=.53).
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION
It was hypothesized that the valuing happiness manipulation adopted from the original
investigation on the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness (Mauss et al., 2011) would cause
participants to experience less positive emotions, compared to controls, when contemplating
their personal happiness. However, facial electromyography data collected from both the
corrugator supercilii and zygomaticus major facial muscle sites failed to support this hypothesis.
This finding suggests that valuing happiness does not influence how positive versus negative
ones thoughts are when contemplating their happiness.
While there is no evidence for between-condition differences in the emotions experienced
during the happiness-contemplation phase, there are notable between-condition differences in the
associations between facial electromyography activation during this phase and later self-reports
of happiness. For the control condition controls (average r=.-.29 for corrugator, average r=.14
for zygomaticus), both of these correlations trend in an intuitive way; with decreases in
corrugator activation (negative affect) and increases in zygomaticus activation (positive affect)
being positively associated with self-reported happiness. These associations make sense; if one
experiences more positive affect when contemplating happiness, he or she likely is a happier
person. However, for the participants manipulated to value happiness (average r=.41 for
corrugator, average r=-.09 for zygomaticus), the associations trend in the opposite direction,
wherein increases in positive affect during the contemplation stage are associated with lower
ratings of overall happiness. Although the tested between-condition differences in these
correlations do not meet the often accepted .05 p-value standard (.09 for corrugator supercilii, .34
for zygomaticus major), we should be careful to avoid the .05 “cliff effect” drop in confidence
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when p-values exceed the accepted .05 threshold (Rosenthal & Gaito, 1963). Considering the
extremely small sample size in the present study, it would be rash to dismiss the betweencondition difference in corrugator activation and happiness self-report associations that trends
towards significant despite a limited amount of data points. In short, although the valuing
happiness does not significantly influence the emotional content generated during the retrieval
phase of the evaluative judgment of happiness, it appears that this manipulation may impact how
the generated information is utilized in the judgment of personal happiness.
Results from this study provide preliminary evidence that the paradoxical effects of
valuing happiness manifest within the judgment, as opposed to retrieval, phase of an evaluative
judgment of happiness. Although largely speculative, there are two feasible explanations for why
the valuing happiness manipulation did not seemingly influence participants’ emotionality while
contemplating their happiness. The first speculation is that the lack of differences may derive
from differences in the emotional regulation strategies afforded by the original study’s film
viewing paradigm and the current study’s evaluative judgment of happiness paradigm, which
may have resulted in ceiling effects in the emotionality experienced during the happiness
contemplation task. The second explanation is that these lack of differences may be mediated by
the differences in the cognitive load demanded by the two tasks.
Emotional Regulation
The lack of between-condition differences in the happiness contemplation task may be
due to the emotional regulation strategies afforded by this task. Whereas the emotional film clip
task utilized in the previous studies did not afford any emotional regulation tasks, there is a
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myriad of emotional regulation strategies that participants in the current study could have
employed while contemplating their happiness.
In theory, to increase how affectively pleasant an emotional response is, people can, and
sometimes do, employ positive emotion up-regulation strategies (Parrott, 1993; Gross, Richards
& John, 2006). Emotional up-regulation strategies are characterized by savoring, intentionally
increasing the frequency of, or enhancing one’s positive emotional experiences (Tugade &
Fredrickson, 2007). In addition to these more established strategies, recent research has
demonstrated that the up-regulation of positive emotions during the viewing of positive picture
also is possible when participants intentionally increase their immersion in the image (Pavlov,
Reva, Loktev, Tumyalis, Korenyok & Aftanas, 2014). However, this emotional up-regulation
occurred only after participants practiced and were trained on how to perform this strategy. So
far, though, there is no evidence that participants have the ability or the natural tendency to
actively employ these up-regulation strategies during film or image viewing without
experimenter training or prompt cues. Therefore, it is likely that the participants in the original
study who reported feelings of disappointment towards their emotional reactions were unable to
upregulate their affective experiences.
On the other hand, in the current study, participants were asked to contemplate their own
happiness; a task over which they could exercise more cognitive control. In contrast to the
emotional film clip paradigm, participants can presumably savor a particular thought,
intentionally increase the frequency of positive thoughts, enhance the emotional experience of a
thought by forcing smiling behavior, and/or utilize cognitive reappraisal strategies when
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encountering negative thoughts during their mental contemplations of personal happiness
(Lazarus & Alfert, 1964). In fact, intentional smiling behavior by a few participants was
observed in this study. Therefore, the evaluative judgment of happiness paradigm utilized in the
present study likely resulted in ceiling effects, as all participants likely intentionally chose to
think positive thoughts and exercise positive up-regulation strategies when necessary. As
opposed to the film clip participants who may have experienced disappointment at their partially
uncontrollable affective experiences, participants in the current study could have feasibly
employed positive up-regulation strategies to counteract any feelings of emotional inadequacy or
disappointment.
Cognitive Load
Alternatively, the converging results may be attributed to differences in the extent of
cognitive processing that each of these tasks demanded. Compared to an evaluation of one’s
subjective happiness, a film clip is a more passive experience that requires less mental effort
from participants. Therefore, participants presumably have ample cognitive resources to assess
and experience disappointment at their own affective experiences. However, working memory is
not an infinite resource (Miller, 1956), and contemplating one’s happiness is presumably a more
demanding cognitive task than viewing a video. Therefore, while reflecting upon their happiness
in the present study, it is possible that participants did not possess enough residual working
memory to simultaneously consider the value of happiness, consciously reflect upon their
affective experience, and/or experience disappointment at these reactions. Therefore, the current
study’s paradigm may not have allowed enough residual working memory to employ the
cognitive process that is previously theorized to mediate the paradoxical effects of valuing
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happiness: disappointment at one’s own emotional reaction to the experimental task (Mauss et
al., 2011). However, the fact that differences arose in the judgment task, which is presumable an
equally as demanding cognitive task suggest that this alternative explanation is unlikely.
Limitations
While this study provides some preliminary insight into a novel aspect of the paradoxical
effects of valuing happiness, there are some limitations associated with the present study. For
instance, in the original study on the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness, the true nature of
the study was not disclosed to participants during the informed consent proceedings. Instead,
participants were led to believe that they were partaking in a study that was interested in
television programming. Although both the original and present studies both utilized the same
valuing happiness manipulation, the present study’s informed consent procedure (Appendix E)
did not contain the same degree of deception. Instead, the purpose of the study was explained in
truthful, but ambiguous terms. It is therefore possible that the lack of a consistent deception
allowed some participants to realize the sham nature of the manipulation article. Since the
current study did not employ any manipulation checks, there is no way to address the validity of
this potential limitation. However, considering that the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness
seemingly manifested itself when participants’ judges their own happiness, it appears that this
lack of deception was permissible.
Another limitation of this study was that the valuing happiness manipulation, although
previously validated, was not specifically geared towards the task utilized in the present study.
Instead, the manipulation specifically emphasizes the importance of maximizing moment-tomoment emotionality, as opposed to one’s overall sense of life satisfaction, perceived meaning in
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life, or global happiness. Therefore, it was difficult to assess whether the manipulation truly was
appropriate for this experiment. Furthermore, in the original study, participants in the control
condition received a sham article that emphasized the importance of accurate judgments instead
of happiness, whereas in the current study a pure, no control group article was utilized. While
there is no reason to believe that this could have influenced results, the differences in control
groups could be considered a potential limitation.
In addition, participants in the current study may have realized that the experimenter was
interested in facial muscle movement, due to the fact that electrodes were clearly attached to the
face. Previous experiments have tried to address this limitation by attaching electrodes to
additional irrelevant contact sites, such as the head and neck, in order to disguise the
experimenter’s true variables of interest. However, this tactic was not utilized in this experiment,
and there were no manipulation checks to assess whether participants knew that facial activity
was the variable of interest. Notably, however, before participating, all participants
acknowledged that they were unfamiliar with facial electromyography procedure. In addition,
during debriefing procedures, some participants serendipitously stated that they were surprised
that this procedure was capable, to some extent, of probing their emotional reactions.
Another limitation of the present study was the fact that participants performed maximum
voluntary contractions (MVCs) prior to beginning the experiment, which may have introduced
fatigue during the following baseline collection procedures. Future research interested in
utilizing MVC standardization procedures should consider saving this procedure for the end of
the experiment.
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An additional potential criticism of this study is that participants in the manipulation
condition had more time to habituate to the facial electromyography sensors than those in the
control condition. This criticism is based off the fact that the sham article manipulation gave
participants an extra 20-40 seconds to habituate to the sensors. Although there appears to be no
work on how long it takes a participant to habituate to facial electromyography electrodes
attachment, due to the time intensive nature of set-up , MVC recordings, and baseline readings, it
is maintained that all participants, regardless of whether they received this short manipulation,
had ample time to habituate to the electrodes placed on their face.
In addition to these methodological limitations, the current study utilized a small sample
size; with approximately 10 participants in each condition. It is therefore very difficult to achieve
statistical significance, and it is possible that Type II errors exist.
Future Directions
“Shoot for the moon. Even if you miss, you’ll land among the stars” is a quote often
attributed to motivational speaker Les Brown. Considering the fact that stars are actually further
away from Earth than the moon, I propose a slight amendment that is more suiting for this thesis:
“Shoot for the stars. Even if you come up short, you might land on the moon.” At the University
of Central Florida, where this thesis work was performed, “Reach for the Stars” is the official
school slogan. In many ways, this undergraduate thesis was a reach for the stars; it utilized a
unique perspective of happiness (evaluative judgments) in a novel paradigm (happiness
contemplation) with difficult psychophysiological methodology (facial electromyography.) That
being said, a review of the limitations of the thesis suggest that the execution of the study was far
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from perfect. However, while the study’s execution may have not made it to the metaphorical
stars, I maintain that it certainly landed on our metaphorical moon, as the results of this study
uncovered preliminary evidence for a novel manifestation of the paradoxical effects of valuing
happiness. Due to the small sample size, this difference did not quite reach statistical
significance. However, future research should strongly consider following up on this promising
insight by running the experiment with a larger participant population.
In addition to a potentially novel insight, several lessons were learned from this execution
of this study. For example, Maximum Voluntary Contractions (MVCs) were utilized to
standardize participants’ facial electromyography activation, which, in theory, should account for
individual differences in facial muscle strength and reduce between-participant variation.
Although the usage of MVC’s is common in more general electromyography investigations (i.e.:
ones concerned with muscles such as the bicep) and are discussed in Fridlund and Cacioppo’s
(1986) guidelines for facial electromyography, the use of this particular standardization
technique still is uncommon in facial electromyography methodology. Future studies should
examine whether this standardization procedure effectively reduces between-participant variation
in facial electromyography activation, and if so, investigate the most effective way to include this
procedure in an experiment. In the present study, participants performed MVC’s in the beginning
of the study. However, in hindsight, employing this procedure in the beginning of an experiment
has some limitations. For starters, teaching participants to perform MVC’s may inadvertently
lead participants to understand that the experimenter is interested in facial expressions. Second,
these MVC’s can fatigue the facial muscles, potentially confounding any measure taken directly
after the procedure. In the present study, participants’ baseline measures were collected shortly
32

after they performed their MVCs, meaning that their baseline activation may have been lowered
by muscle fatigue. Based on consideration of these two limitations, it may be advantageous to
collect MVC’s at the end of a study. Saving this procedure for the end of the experiment may
ensure that participants are not aware of the experimenter’s interest in facial expressions, and
that the muscles of interest are not unnecessarily fatigued before the beginning of the
experiment.
This study focused on facial electromyography activation during the retrieval component
of the evaluative judgment of happiness. Results suggested that no significant difference in facial
electromyography excited, although this activation correlated quite differently between the
manipulation and control conditions. The difference between these correlations is interesting
because it suggests that participants who are manipulated to value happiness may utilize the
retrieved information in a different way than controls during the judgment phase of the
evaluative judgment of happiness. While this finding is interesting, there is a lack of
understanding on how exactly the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness influence
participants’ cognitive processes in these conditions, and how these can be potentially overcome.
Future research may find it advantageous to collect facial electromyography during this
judgment portion as well, as this will lead to greater insight into how this information is being
utilized. In addition, future research should consider think-aloud techniques during evaluative
judgments of happiness, which will provide a qualitatively rich insight into this cognitive
process. Last, future research should focus on how the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness
can be potentially overcome.
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Considering the idea that happiness is a multifaceted construct, and that affectivity is only
one of it factors, future researchers should continue to investigate the paradoxical effects of
valuing happiness from varied conceptualizations of happiness, such as ones that emphasize
eudemonic, as opposed to purely hedonic, aspects of the construct. For example, one may
question whether the proposed paradoxical effects of valuing happiness influence participants’
sense meaning in life, life satisfaction, or perception of “balance.” In addition, future research
may consider a more thorough degree of participant deception and a larger sample size.
Conclusion
The purpose of the study was to determine whether manipulating participants to value
happiness causes them to experience less positive emotion when mentally contemplating their
own happiness; a phenomenon referred to as “the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness”
(Mauss et al., 2011). To nonobtrusively and continuously probe participant emotionality while
they thought about their own happiness, facial electromyography was utilized. Results indicated
that there were no significant differences in either corrugator or zygomaticus muscle activation
between participants manipulated to value happiness and controls. Therefore, it is concluded that
the valuing happiness manipulation did not influence the positivity or negativity of participants’
emotions when they contemplated their happiness.
Although participants’ did not significantly differ in the emotional content of their
thought during the retrieval-based contemplation of happiness, results demonstrated that the
correlations between corrugator supercilii activation and participants’ ratings of happiness
differed markedly between those who were manipulated to value happiness and those who
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served as controls (p=.09). Although a small sample size inhibited this difference from reaching
statistical significance, these results provide preliminary evidence that the paradoxical effects of
valuing happiness may influence this judgment process in a negative way. This particular insight
points to a unique, potentially novel dynamic of the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness,
suggesting that it not only influence participants’ emotionality, but also how they subjectively
evaluative their overall happiness.
While increased personal happiness is related to a myriad of beneficial outcomes (Diener
& Ryan 2009; Lyubomirsky, King & Diener, 2005), it is important for researchers to consider
and systematically research whether a societal emphasis on happiness can be detrimental. While
utilitarian principles and political interests in societal happiness intuitively seem like admirable
endeavors that would likely garner significant public support, evidence for the paradoxical
effects of valuing happiness warns that, under certain circumstances, these endeavors may be
self-destructive. Happiness researchers should continue to take this notion seriously, and strive to
understand the paradoxical effects of valuing happiness to a fuller extent. A deeper
understanding of the paradoxical effects will not only shed light on this interesting psychological
phenomenon, but also potentially uncover ways in which this psychological barrier to increased
societal happiness can be overcome.
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APPENDIX A: FIGURE 1
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Figure 1
A simple model of the survey response process, with a distinction of the scope of the evaluative
judgment of happiness perspective. Adapted from Groves et al., 2004.
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APPENDIX B: TABLE 1
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Table 1
Processed Corrugator Supercilii Activation during Happiness Contemplation Task
Control

Manipulation

M

SD

M

SD

p-value

0-5 second

.005

.031

-.006

.046

.60

5-10 second

.007

.033

-.005

.033

.24

10-15 second

.007

.033

-.002

.033

.45

15-20 second

.011

.034

-.002

.032

.11

20-25 second

.010

.034

-.002

.03

.21

25-30 second

.009

.032

-.002

.026

.28

30-35 second

.01

.032

-.004

.028

.18

35-40 second

.008

.032

-.001

.03

.40

40-45 second

.011

.034

.003

.025

.36

Note. For each five second increment, the unit of analysis was calculating by finding the average
difference between corrugator supercilii activation during the task and during the baseline.
Before this calculation was performed, the raw signal was rectified, smoothed, and standardized
based off the average of participants’ Maximum Voluntary Contractions. To analyze the
difference between conditions, independent sample t-tests were performed.
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APPENDIX C: TABLE 2
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Table 2
Processed Zygomaticus Major Activation during Happiness Contemplation Task
Control

Manipulation

M

SD

M

SD

p-value

0-5 second

-.043

.095

-.013

.055

.42

5-10 second

-.049

.093

-.014

.054

.34

10-15 second

-.05

.094

-.015

.048

.32

15-20 second

-.05

.092

-.014

.049

.31

20-25 second

-.051

.091

-.016

.054

.34

25-30 second

-.049

.088

-.006

.061

.24

30-35 second

-.05

.086

-.002

.06

.18

35-40 second

-.05

.086

-.003

.06

.19

40-45 second

-.05

.081

.001

.059

.14

Note. For each five second increment, the unit of analysis was calculating by finding the average
difference between zygomaticus major activation during the task and during the baseline. Before
this calculation was performed, the raw signal was rectified, smoothed, and standardized based
off the average of participants’ Maximum Voluntary Contractions. To analyze the difference
between conditions, independent sample t-tests were performed.
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APPENDIX D: VALUING HAPPINESS MANIPULATION
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“As a product of psychological research on well-being, broadcasting companies are trying to
evaluate the programming they offer to the public. Historically, television programming has been
evaluated with respect to decency or information content. As a result of hefty losses in revenue,
there has been a push by television networks for empirical study of other effects that
programming has on viewers. We are especially interested in the effects that programs have on
emotions that viewers experience, because there is considerable evidence that certain emotions
can have specific outcomes in viewers' daily lives.
For example, as is well-known, people who report higher than normal levels of happiness
experience benefits in their social relationships, professional success, and overall health and
well-being. That is, happiness not only feels good, it also carries important benefits: the happier
people can make themselves feel from moment to moment, the more likely they are to be
successful, healthy, and popular. Conversely, the less happy people feel from moment to
moment, the less likely they are to be successful, healthy, and popular. In fact, recent research
shows that people who are able to achieve the greatest amount of happiness in all kinds of
circumstances, even momentarily, can experience long-term beneficial outcomes. In other words,
people who experience high levels of happiness and other positive emotions during film clips
such as the ones you are about to see are people who are generally happier and more successful
in their lives. Our goal, therefore, is to examine how television programs influence a person's
overall experience.”
Figure 2
A copy of the sham article utilized in the Valuing Happiness condition. Manipulation created and
graciously provided by Craig Anderson.
Mauss, I. B., Tamir, M., Anderson, C. L., & Savino, N. S. (2011). Can seeking happiness make
people unhappy? Paradoxical effects of valuing happiness. Emotion, 11(4), 807.
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